The Sino-Indian Contest: Factors Shaping India's Balancing Strategy

   Abstract

The Sino-Indian rivalry presents an enduring, carefully managed competition between two leading Asian powers. Conventional balance-of-power logic suggests that a weaker state facing a rising, capable adversary should engage in robust hard balancing through alliances or arms buildup. Yet India’s response to China’s expanding military and economic influence diverges from these expectations. Instead, India pursues “constrained hard balancing,” adopting selective military cooperation, incremental capability enhancements, and subtle measures to limit Chinese sway—without fully committing to formal alliances. While the absence of an existential threat partly accounts for India’s restraint, two overlooked factors deepen understanding: “weaponized interdependence” and domestic identity politics. China’s centrality in global supply chains and technology spheres heightens the costs of overt balancing, as India risks punitive economic retaliation. Meanwhile, India’s domestic identity imperatives—shaped by historical legacies, nationalist sentiment, and the aspiration for strategic autonomy—discourage reliance on alliances that might imply dependency or diminished status. This article integrates these variables, illustrating how global economic entanglements and national self-perceptions together produce a more cautious balancing posture. It concludes by proposing policy interventions—such as economic diversification, flexible coalitions, and normative frameworks—that can mitigate vulnerabilities and help states navigate rivalries without escalating into destabilizing confrontations.

Introduction

For observers of international relations, the Sino-Indian rivalry presents an intriguing puzzle. Standard realist thinking posits that as one state’s power grows significantly, its neighbour should respond by forging strong alliances or pursuing symmetrical military modernization to maintain a balance.[i] In the decades since the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, China’s capabilities have expanded substantially—economically, militarily, and technologically—India’s strategic response has not produced robust, formalized alliances or an arms race of matching intensity.[ii]

India’s strategy vis-à-vis China has been more measured and multifaceted. On one hand, New Delhi has deepened strategic ties with select partners—such as the United States, Japan, and Australia—conducting limited joint exercises, engaging in high-level strategic dialogues, and selectively acquiring advanced weaponry to enhance deterrence without provoking a full-fledged arms race.[iii] On the other hand, India has shown reluctance to enter into binding alliance treaties reminiscent of Cold War-era commitments, preferring less formal and more flexible arrangements.

This calculated restraint can be better understood by comparing India’s perceptions of China to those of Pakistan. While India views Pakistan as a persistently hostile neighbour, having fought multiple wars and facing ongoing terrorism and nuclear shadowing, its rivalry with Pakistan has often been seen in existential terms—one threatening the very idea of a united, secure Indian state. By contrast, although India sees China as a formidable military and economic competitor and recognizes the gravity of outstanding territorial disputes, it does not perceive Beijing as actively seeking its political destruction or subordination. Consequently, the same urgency that might lead to tight, security-driven coalitions against a truly existential enemy is absent in the Sino-Indian context, resulting in more calibrated and incremental balancing moves instead of all-encompassing alliances.[iv]

Still, this explanation leaves open questions. Why does India persist with such measured behaviour even as China incrementally tests its resolve along contested borders and extends its economic and security reach across the Indo-Pacific region? The concept of “soft balancing”—where states use non-military instruments like economic, diplomatic, or institutional manoeuvres to contain a stronger rival—–has clear relevance to India’s measured approach toward China.[v] This framework illuminates how indirect methods can limit an adversary’s influence without escalating conflict or forging formal alliances. Some aspects of India’s strategy, including selective trade policies, multilateral coalitions (like the Quad), and diplomatic resistance to Chinese initiatives, reflect soft balancing principles. This brief argues that India’s measured approach toward China extends beyond this lens by highlighting two critical but underemphasized considerations that can shed light on this puzzle.

The first is the concept of “weaponized interdependence”: states that occupy central positions in crucial global economic and technological networks can manipulate these connections to exert leverage on others, threatening disruptions that could damage a rival’s economy or technological base.[vi] China’s dominance in certain value chains, resource supplies, and technological sectors means that overt hard balancing against Beijing risks costly retaliation for India.

The second factor is India’s domestic identity politics. India’s post-colonial strategic culture, framed by ambitions for great-power status, a longstanding tradition of policy autonomy, and nationalist sentiments wary of perceived subordination, discourages seeking overt “protection” through alliances.[vii] While policymakers acknowledge China’s challenge, they remain sensitive to how alliances could undermine India’s image as an independent, rising power. By combining these two dynamics—external constraints arising from economic vulnerabilities and internal sensitivities linked to historical narratives and national identity—we gain a more holistic understanding of India’s preference for constrained balancing measures. While “soft balancing” is undeniably relevant, these additional factors serve to better clarify why India adopts a more constrained, cautious approach toward China and help explain its strategic restraint.

This article proceeds as follows. First, it reviews theoretical approaches to balancing and their limitations in explaining India’s stance. Second, it introduces weaponized interdependence as a critical external constraint on hard balancing. Third, it examines how India’s domestic identity considerations produce reluctance to form rigid alliances. Fourth, it illustrates how these factors intersect in the Sino-Indian context. Finally, the article offers policy recommendations that highlight avenues for mitigating economic vulnerabilities, establishing normative frameworks, and adopting flexible cooperation schemes that respect domestic identity imperatives.

Existing Theories and the Sino-Indian Puzzle

From various vantage points—Chinese, Indian, and Western—India’s restrained approach to the Sino-Indian rivalry poses a notable analytical challenge, diverging from what traditional balance-of-power models might predict. Classic realist theories, articulated notably by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, imply that states facing a significantly more powerful rival, especially one perceived as bent on undermining their interests, should respond with forceful countermeasures—alliances or robust internal balancing. India’s trajectory since the 1962 border war with China, despite the latter’s steadily growing regional assertiveness, infrastructural expansions in disputed areas, and enhanced maritime reach, has not led New Delhi to forge ironclad security pacts or develop capabilities in strict parity with Beijing (Paul 2018). Instead, India has pursued “limited hard balancing,” an approach anchored in incremental arms acquisitions, participation in select multilateral or minilateral frameworks, and flexible, issue-specific collaboration rather than fixed, treaty-based commitments.[viii]

According to Chinese policymakers and analysts, including influential intellectuals of Chinese foreign policy such as Yan Xuetong, China’s rising power and centrality in regional networks shape the strategic environment in ways that deter overt balancing.[ix] They suggest that India’s reluctance to form rigid alliances, even amid Beijing’s accumulating capabilities, reflects acute sensitivity to the coercive potential inherent in global trade and technological interdependencies.[x] In this view, “weaponized interdependence” serves as a subtle deterrent, cautioning New Delhi against strategies that risk economic penalties.[xi]

At the same time, Chinese commentators acknowledge that India’s internal political context—infused with historical memory, nationalist sentiment, and aspirations for global status—renders alliance formation politically and symbolically delicate. As Wang Jisi and other Chinese scholars emphasize, strategic autonomy and resistance to subordination are qualities that India values deeply, discouraging overt reliance on external patrons.[xii]

From the Indian viewpoint, fully embracing alliance-based balancing could invite entanglement in great-power rivalries, compromise strategic independence, and expose India to economic and technological vulnerabilities.[xiii] Indian analysts often underline that while China presents a considerable challenge, it does not constitute an imminent existential threat, mitigating the urgency of alliances with automatic defence obligations.[xiv] In the Western literature, steeped in alliance theory and deterrence logic, India’s measured response appears illuminating. It showcases how non-existential rivalries, embedded in intricate economic and technological webs, yield a strategic calculus that surpasses conventional realist predictions.[xv]

The Chinese emphasis on economic leverage and strategic culture, the Indian focus on autonomy and nuanced threat perception, and the Western recognition of theoretical expansion converge in a more holistic understanding of India’s posture. Rather than viewing New Delhi’s stance as anomalous under balancing, this tripartite perspective reveals a sophisticated negotiation of structural, economic, and domestic pressures that invites more nuanced interpretations of contemporary security strategies.[xvi]

“Weaponized Interdependence” and Its Impact on Balancing Choices

The contemporary international system is increasingly characterized by what might be termed “network-induced constraint,” wherein states’ strategic choices emerge not solely from the interplay of material capabilities and immediate threats, but also from the intricate latticework of global economic and technological networks.[xvii] This shift complicates the conventional logic of balancing. While classical realist frameworks posit that states facing a stronger adversary should align more tightly with third parties or undertake substantial internal balancing, the rise of “weaponized interdependence” introduces a new dimension: the risk that overt balancing efforts may trigger economic retaliation facilitated by the adversary’s privileged position in global supply chains, financial circuits, and technological infrastructures.[xviii]

In the Sino-Indian rivalry, China’s embedding in critical segments of global production and innovation—ranging from pharmaceuticals and microelectronics to data infrastructure—provides Beijing with latent coercive capabilities. Should India opt for explicit, treaty-based alliances clearly designed to counter China’s ascendancy, Beijing could employ what might be conceived as “inverted deterrence”: rather than simply threatening military costs, it could inflict strategic pain through selective economic strangulation, regulatory entanglements, or constrained technology transfers.[xix] Unlike the immediate and overt signals of military deterrence, this form of coercion remains subtle, diffuse, and profoundly integrated into routine economic interactions, making it more politically palatable and harder to attribute. It challenges the notion of unconstrained agency in traditional balancing calculations, compelling the weaker state to navigate a labyrinth of non-military vulnerabilities.

For India, the recognition of these intricacies necessitates strategic restraint. Full-fledged alignment with a single great power patron, especially in an overtly anti-China configuration, risks provoking the very kind of retaliatory economic manipulation New Delhi seeks to avoid.[xx]  India’s response, therefore, embodies a form of “calibrated multiplexity,” incorporating incremental arms acquisitions, minilateral defence dialogues, selective maritime exercises, and issue-specific partnerships that preserve flexibility and diffuse reliance.[xxi] In doing so, India pursues what Jonathan Kirshner might label a strategy for navigating a world of uncertainty: rather than tethering its fortunes to a rigid bloc, New Delhi crafts a portfolio of relationships and capabilities that minimize the chance of an all-or-nothing economic squeeze.[xxii]

Western analysts, accustomed to alliance-centric models of deterrence and regional order, find in this behaviour a compelling illustration of the ways in which power, once conceptualized primarily in military terms, increasingly depends on access, control, and influence within global networks.[xxiii] From the standpoint of identity and domestic politics, India’s restrained posture also resonates with long-standing traditions of strategic autonomy and sovereignty-consciousness that reject overt dependency on external guarantors.[xxiv]

In sum, the interplay of weaponized interdependence, domestic imperatives, and normative aspirations for autonomy is remoulding the balancing toolkit. India’s limited hard balancing emerges as a nuanced adaptation to the twenty-first-century environment—one where the strongest deterrent may not be missiles or fleets, but the capacity to shape, disrupt, or safeguard the very networks on which all states depend.

Domestic Identity Politics: Balancing Without Losing Autonomy and Status

While economic vulnerabilities and networked interdependencies set the structural parameters of state behaviour, domestic political narratives and identity frameworks invest these constraints with potent symbolic value. In India’s case, the interplay of historical memory, nationalist sentiment, and the pursuit of status as an autonomous great power reinforces its pattern of constrained hard balancing. Building on the logic outlined in previous sections—where the threat of weaponized interdependence complicates straightforward alliance decisions—domestic identity politics further conditions India’s response to China’s rise.

India’s strategic culture, profoundly shaped by its colonial experience, remains highly sensitive to any security arrangement that could be interpreted as eroding autonomy or placing New Delhi in a dependent position vis-à-vis an external actor. Unlike states that readily embrace alliance commitments to counter immediate threats, Indian elites and the broader public often view rigid alliances through a lens tinted by historical vulnerability. Memories of foreign domination—first under colonial rule and later through various forms of external pressure—make formal defence pacts appear as concessions of self-determination rather than prudent strategic choices.

This scepticism toward external encumbrances is not merely theoretical. After independence, India’s partial alignment with the Soviet Union in economic doctrine and development strategy serves as a historical reminder of the risks entailed by leaning too heavily on one source of external support. Influenced by Soviet-style centralized planning and socialist tenets, India pursued inward-looking economic policies that ultimately limited competitiveness, slowed growth, and constrained policy options.[xxv] Although these policies were not formal defence alliances, the broader alignment with Soviet principles illustrated the dangers of allowing external ideological frameworks—tied to strategic calculations—to shape India’s economic path. This legacy strengthens contemporary anxieties about relinquishing autonomy, making policymakers wary of formal alliances that might similarly curtail economic dynamism or strategic freedom.

Such concerns are heightened by India’s self-image as a rising power aspiring to shape international norms and regional order, not merely respond to them. Formal alliances that imply reliance on a more powerful patron risk undercutting this image, potentially relegating India to a secondary status within another’s strategic orbit. Instead, Indian leaders prefer to cultivate an environment of flexible cooperation—participating in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia; engaging in selective arms acquisitions; and investing in indigenous defence capabilities—to demonstrate that India can address China’s assertiveness without appearing subservient to an external protector.[xxvi]

Externally, this measured stance signals to China that while India is not passively acquiescent, it also avoids rash moves that might provoke economic or military escalation. Internally, it reassures domestic constituencies that India remains sovereign over its strategic destiny. By crafting a balancing posture that integrates structural constraints with an enduring ethos of autonomy and self-reliance, India navigates the Sino-Indian rivalry without jeopardizing the historical and political foundations of its national identity.[xxvii]

Intersecting Constraints in the Sino-Indian Context

To fully appreciate the interplay between weaponized interdependence and domestic identity politics, it is critical to examine how these constraints manifest in the concrete flashpoints of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Along the Line of Actual Control, China’s infrastructure development, patrols, and encroachments periodically escalate tensions, culminating in crises like the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. In response, India has demonstrated a capacity for swift and resolute action—reinforcing border deployments, scrutinizing Chinese investments, and sending signals of displeasure through selective economic restrictions.[xxviii] Yet these measures, notable as they are, remain carefully calibrated. They do not crystallize into formal alliance commitments or trigger a wholesale strategic decoupling from China’s economic networks.

The absence of such definitive moves is not a symptom of indecision or weakness; rather, it reflects a sophisticated balancing act, one deeply informed by the twin constraints discussed previously. On one hand, the potential for weaponized interdependence looms large. Indian leaders understand that aggressive hard balancing might invite retaliatory measures in the form of curtailed technology transfers, restricted market access, or hampered supply chains—moves that could derail India’s broader developmental trajectory and undercut its global ambitions.[xxix] On the other hand, forging an overtly anti-China alliance, especially if it implies a subordinate role to the United States or another major power, would clash with India’s deeply ingrained identity imperatives of autonomy, status, and independent decision-making.[xxx]

In this delicate environment, India’s strategy exemplifies a form of “moderated assertiveness.” Rather than lurching toward a formal balancing coalition, New Delhi imposes selective costs on Beijing—blocking certain Chinese apps, diversifying supply chains, and deepening strategic dialogues with partners like Japan and Australia. It also participates in loosely structured regional arrangements that nudge the Indo-Pacific architecture in ways less conducive to unchecked Chinese influence, all while avoiding commitments that would appear as ceding strategic control. As a result, India’s approach resonates with the logic set forth in previous sections: the heightened costs of direct confrontation imposed by China’s network dominance and the enduring resonance of a post-colonial strategic culture that eschews dependency.

In totality, extending from this analysis, India’s constrained hard balancing should not be understood as a failure to balance in the classical sense, but rather as a deliberate navigation of twenty-first-century complexities. India’s behaviour highlights how states today must reconcile age-old drives for security and autonomy with the subtler pressures of economic interdependence and identity politics. The Sino-Indian rivalry, in this sense, serves as a compelling case where old theoretical assumptions yield to more nuanced interpretations, illustrating how the power of networks and the force of historical narratives can profoundly shape strategic outcomes. By neither acquiescing to China’s ambitions nor racing headlong into rigid alignments, India encapsulates the challenge of crafting foreign policy in a world where material capabilities and moral imperatives are ever more entangled.

Strengthening Factors Shaping Constrained Hard Balancing

Recognizing the factors that produce constrained hard balancing in the Sino-Indian rivalry can help policymakers and international institutions develop strategies to reduce tensions, mitigate risks, and foster a stable security environment.

Diversify Supply Chains and Economic Partnerships: Reducing reliance on networks dominated by a single state can lessen vulnerabilities to weaponized interdependence. India, along with partners in Southeast Asia, Japan, Australia, and beyond, should invest in alternative production lines and encourage investment in resilient infrastructure. International financial institutions and development banks can support capacity-building to enable countries to maintain more balanced economic ties.

Institutionalize Crisis Management Mechanisms: Historical agreements between China and India have occasionally helped prevent large-scale escalations. Strengthening these mechanisms—such as border management protocols, military hotlines, and regular high-level summits—can reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings.

Promote Modular and Issue-Based Cooperation: Instead of pressuring India into broad, treaty-based alliances, external actors interested in maintaining regional stability should cultivate modular partnerships centred on specific issues—such as maritime security, infrastructure connectivity, cybersecurity, or counterterrorism. These flexible arrangements allow India to align with others on shared interests without compromising its self-image or triggering excessive Chinese economic retaliation.

Develop International Norms Against Economic Coercion: The rise of weaponized interdependence calls for normative frameworks that discourage states from exploiting central positions in global networks for undue leverage. Multilateral institutions and regulatory bodies can set guidelines on data privacy, secure supply chains, and standards for fair trade practices. By embedding these principles into international law and normative standards, the global community can reduce the attractiveness of economic coercion as a policy tool.

Foster Historical Reconciliation and Identity Accommodation: Overcoming entrenched suspicion requires addressing the historical narratives that fuel mistrust.[xxxi] Informal dialogues, educational exchanges, and joint historical research projects could gradually reframe how both sides view the past. Minimizing identity-based antagonisms can, over time, allow more policy space for rational assessments of security needs. Reducing the domestic political costs of limited cooperation or measured balancing would help foster an environment more conducive to stable rivalry management.

Concluding Observations:

Despite the complexities of government-to-government relations, there remains significant potential for India and China to foster a more constructive coexistence—one grounded not solely in the strategic calculations of state actors, but also in the everyday interactions and aspirations of their peoples. History shows that profound shifts in once-tense relationships are possible. Consider the trajectory of European powers like France and the United Kingdom, or France and Germany, who overcame bitter centuries-old animosities to forge durable partnerships. Their examples demonstrate that with sustained diplomatic initiatives, cultural exchanges, and economic interdependence built on trust, states can reimagine long-standing rivalries into stable, mutually beneficial relationships.

For India and China, realizing this vision will not be without its hurdles. Their distinct economic models, divergent governance structures, and complex security interests often create friction at the state level. However, beneath these official policies, there are vibrant threads of people-to-people contact—shared business ventures, educational ties, tourism, and cultural engagements—that offer glimpses of what a more harmonious future could entail. Encouraging deeper societal connections can sow the seeds of empathy and understanding, gradually easing the geopolitical tensions that stand in the way.

To advance this process, governments can pursue structured dialogues that go beyond crisis management and border negotiations, instead focusing on long-term stability. Building transparent mechanisms for conflict resolution, engaging in cooperative development projects, and reinforcing institutions for regional integration can all help reduce suspicion and foster a sense of common purpose. Whether it is through bolstering climate change cooperation, enhancing public health collaboration, or jointly developing digital infrastructures, constructive partnerships can anchor the relationship in practical achievements rather than zero-sum calculations.

Ultimately, the emergence of a more positive Indo-Chinese dynamic will depend on courage and foresight at the highest levels of policymaking, coupled with the will of ordinary citizens who envision a more prosperous and peaceful shared future. Like Europe’s erstwhile adversaries, India and China can learn that strategic rivalry need not be permanent. With patience, sustained engagement, and genuine efforts to bridge political and economic differences, both countries have the capacity to transform historical suspicions into a legacy of progress and coexistence.

Vishal Singh Bhadauriya is a Post-Doctoral Candidate in the Department of History at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India. He previously served as an Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) Doctoral Fellow. His research specializes in modern Asian history, with a particular focus on the geopolitical and historical interactions between India, China, and Nepal, and the enduring impact of colonial-era policies on contemporary regional dynamics.

Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available including graphics and images are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of Asian Confluence.