Commentaries

By CV Lalmalsawmi

 Keywords: Mizoram, Assembly Elections, Ethnoreligious, Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons

Date: 31st Oct, 2023

 

As Mizoram goes to polls on November 7, 2023, there are old and new players competing for the 40-seat assembly. The upcoming elections may end the three decades old ‘two-party system’ in the state with the entry of Zoram People’s Movement (ZPM) that promises a corruption-free and people-centred government while the Indian National Congress (INC) is putting up a staunch fight. The stakes are also high for the incumbent Mizo National Front (MNF) which is vying for a second term.

The announcement of the date for the state assembly election by the Election Commission was immediately met with criticism in a state where the majority are Church-going Christians and the influence of religion looms large over the political sphere. Contesting parties quickly raised objections to the stipulated date for vote counting which falls on a Sunday.

It is not surprising that all the major contenders in the fray–––the ruling MNF and the ZPM–––have positioned themselves as uniquely catering to the Mizo Christian sentiments in their party conduct and policy. The INC also appears to be using protection of religious and cultural rights as its modus operandi to counter the MNF and the rising ZPM as witnessed during Rahul Gandhi’s recent visit to Mizoram.

The BJP’s continued marginal presence in the state, despite its widening expanse in the rest of the region, can be attributed to the Mizos’ collective defiance of the ideological politics of the regime in power at the national level. The MNF, which is a part of the BJP-led North-East Democratic Alliance (NEDA), has tried to distance itself from the BJP’s core ideology, policies and legislations affecting Mizo identity, culture and religion such as the Uniform Civil Code.

As a majority community in Mizoram, the Mizos profess a distinct and well-entrenched ethno-religious identity which refuses to be subsumed under the Hindu ultra-nationalist project of the BJP-RSS. Any association with the BJP or its subsidiary like the NEDA is frowned upon by the general public.

With national politics split into the Congress-INDIA alliance and the BJP-NDA, there are speculations about whether the ZPM will eventually jump into the NDA camp. However, it may not be a simple left, right and centre politics in Mizoram. While ZPM, as an emergent party, espouses for its own brand of Mizo nationalist ideology, it has also campaigned heavily on the slogan of Kalphung Thar (which calls for a paradigm shift in the system of governance), as manifested in the choice of candidates in several constituencies who are from non-political backgrounds to usher in the ‘promised change’.

Viewed favourably among neutral voters, ZPM leader and chief ministerial candidate Pu Lalduhoma is a familiar face in the political scene and a contemporary of Pu Lalthanhawla and Pu Zoramthanga, two long-term chief ministers. 

Moreover, the political culture in the state along with the electoral dynamics has undergone tremendous changes in recent years. This could be attributed to the rise in new and critical media platforms, easier access to media technology including social media and the rise of urban educated middle class. In particular, the young voters of 2023 (below 35 years of age) are a sceptical, critical and hard-to-please electorate who will not easily buy into rhetorics and business-as-usual style of campaigns.  

ZPM as a third front contender in an otherwise two-party poll system has also apparently rekindled interests in electoral processes among the youths. The ‘ZPM wave’ is definitely felt by its opponents. Eventually, the people of Mizoram will decide its electoral fate. In any case, the task to overhaul the political system will be an uphill climb.  

Mizoram today is faced with many challenges from within and outside its borders. The influx of tens of thousands of refugees from Myanmar and internally displaced people from Manipur on humanitarian grounds has exposed the state’s deficiencies, particularly its financial woes. Like its counterparts in the region, there is a growing public discord over Mizoram’s dependency syndrome vis-a-vis the central government.

The state is currently crippled by debts called leiba in the vernacular language. While Mizoram’s 2023-24 GSDP is estimated to be at a 19 percent growth over the financial year 2022-23, the state continues to grapple with revenue and fiscal deficits. Mizoram’s fiscal deficit is estimated to be 7 percent in 2022-23 much above the budget estimate of 3.1 percent and twice the norms set by the central government (3.5 percent) according to PRS Legislative Research. Recently, it has been revealed that Mizoram is the “worst offender” in the debt to GDP ratio among states reaching an alarming 53.1 percent as per FY23 due to mounting borrowings.

Understandably, the issue of leiba is a major poll plank along with poor state of critical infrastructure such as inter-district and inter-village roads and transport, electricity and water supply, healthcare facilities as well as rural development. The sporadic implementation of the much-hyped MNF’s flagship scheme of Socio-Economic Development Programme (SEDP) is mired in controversies.

The upcoming assembly election has an interesting facet to it which was not present in the previous 2018 election–––the crises in Mizoram’s neighbourhood. An important question that is often asked is whether the MNF will benefit from its current government’s “open door policy” to the refuge-seeking Chins and Kuki-Zomis from Myanmar and Manipur respectively.

This policy approach is centred on a mixture of humanitarianism and pan-Mizo ethnic brotherhood. The increasingly embraced narrative for the latter has also helped forge conducive grounds for cross-border solidarity with those considered to be Mizo kindred tribes, known collectively as the Zohnahthlak in their struggle against majoritarian persecution.  

Welcoming Chin refugees is a part of the broader border policy and governance across the Indo-Myanmar region and is seen as a ‘good practice’ to lend a helping hand to neighbours in dire need given Myanmar’s political instability and turmoil. Mizoram has long-term aspirations for the fulfillment of transborder networks of trade, transport and connectivity traversing Myanmar’s Chin State, Rakhine State and Sagaing Region where a sizable portion of Chins reside.  

While Pu Zoramthanga’s government definitely displayed foresight and Mizo nationalist mindset in its large-scale accommodation of the Zohnahthlak in distress, it may not significantly impact electoral ground realities. Despite the overall favourable attitude towards MNF amongst the Zohnahthlak and their agencies, the voters of Mizoram have their own sets of expectations and criteria of a government that delivers on its electoral promises.The performance of MNF in certain key areas of its manifesto falters when measured against such yardsticks.

In an age of widespread social media usage, a political party’s image can be easily tainted by irregularities in development spending, perceived rampant corruption, nepotism in government job recruitments, etc. which could be challenging to overcome by a tall and experienced leadership.

Mizoram has borne the brunt of the Meitei-Kuki/Zo conflict in Manipur as the centre has basically washed its hands but finds its role limited to humanitarian aid and sending relief supplies. There is no doubt that a political solution to the ongoing Manipur crisis is in the interest of Mizoram and the rest of the Northeast region.

The various complex issues concerning the Zohnahthlak and their treatment in Manipur and Myanmar will continue to pique political interests of any government in the state. But the people of Mizoram will eventually decide their own political future according to the prevailing public sentiments, specific development needs and priorities of the state.

The stability of polity in Mizoram, unlike some of its counterparts in the region, is in part due to the entrenchment of regional party ideologues and loyalist cadres. The MNF has capitalized on it for three decades, so did the Congress. However, the entry of a third party in the game may upset the balance in the traditional voting blocs, especially in urban and semi-urban areas. The erstwhile neutral votes may also sway in favour of a new, untested, promising party.

Given these trends and dynamics, it is not clear whether the MNF will manage to wrestle the “25 seats or above” that Pu Zoramthanga has confidently expressed to win or if it will even capture the minimum 21 constituencies required to form a government. There could also be big surprises in the race to the assembly in what is going to be a tightly fought election across many key constituencies.

 

CV Lalmalsawmi is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Her research areas include India-Myanmar Relations, Northeast India and Southeast Asia focusing on border and transborder issues concerning the Chins and Mizos

 

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available  are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of Asian Confluence

 

 

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