Commentaries
Keywords: Japan, India, South Asia, China, Bangladesh, Act East Policy, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Bay of Bengal, Northeast India
Date: 10th Feb, 2025
Japan can now be considered a resident developmental power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. This is primarily because of Japan’s growing role in developmental projects furthering connectivity across the region which is otherwise poorly connected.
As part of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP) boost since the 2010s, it has invested heavily in the region. For India, Japan’s investment of more than 2 Bn USD in the Northeast has been crucial. This complements well with India’s Act East Policies that sought to develop the Northeast as the springboard to the Southeast Asian states.
Long years of home-grown insurgency and infrastructural neglect has left the region in dire need of development to which Japan is a promising extra-regional addition. In 2014, Japan and Bangladesh signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership which led to the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt Initiative, popularly known as the BIG-B.
This initiative will accelerate industrial agglomeration along the Dhaka - Chittagong - Cox’s Bazar belt, further blending Bangladesh’s connection with the rising economies of the ASEAN. The broader vision of all these interventions is to create regional infrastructural units that transcends national boundaries and provide mutual benefits to Japan and the states in the region.
However, this is not how it began at the turn of the mid-20th century. What brought these interesting potentials of Japan’s engagements with South Asia is a series of geopolitical convergences. South Asia’s positioning in Japan’s imagination looks quite starkly different from how things were in the Cold War period.
During the postwar years, South Asia was almost akin to the “other Asia” as Japan’s primary interests were anchored around East and Southeast Asia. South Asian states were also on an inward-looking economic trajectory which allowed little incentives for trade and investments. For India, Japan was also seen as a spoke of the United States’ presence in Asia which was not very appealing to have security ties with.
This seemingly began to change in the post-Cold War period. The South Asian economies started to open up, with India being at the forefront because of its liberalization programme. A good case in point is Sony’s introduction in India being a huge popular success. Earlier, Japanese company Suzuki had partnered with Indian automobile company, Maruti, which was deemed as a success story too.
Around this time, New Delhi’s relations with Washington also improved, having a bearing on its relations with Tokyo. Yet, this was too soon to have convergences between Japan and India along with the South Asian region. Even in the 1990s, Japan and South Asia were in an estranged relationship where there was cordiality but still no real impetus.
Purnendra C Jain remarked, “Japan’s relations with South Asian countries could be compared to two acquaintances whose friendship is limited to an exchange of holiday greetings” in his book aptly named, “Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia.” In fact, Japan’s engagement with the region saw a halt in the late 1990s when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Tokyo takes the Non-Proliferation Treaty seriously and as a result issued harsh condemnation along with economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan.
This finally encountered a shift in the 21st century when Japan’s engagement with the region considerably increased. Japan by then has developed significant stakes in not only East and Southeast Asian regions but across the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean from where most of its energy resources travel.
The rising profile of South Asia and the critical importance of sea lanes of communication for Japan's imports have driven Tokyo to establish a more pronounced presence in the region. Pockets like the Bay of Bengal emerged with a considerable degree of strategic valence from a neglected backwater.
Meanwhile, Japan’s security relations with India developed after the sanctions were taken down in 2001 owing to India’s credible non-proliferation record. Further, India-US relations developed to acquire a security and defence dimension. Japan was a crucial addition to the marked Malabar Exercises from 2007 that started the initial foundations of the present-day Quad grouping.
While Japan’s incentives were soaring in the region, China’s rise was a considerable concern too. Starting the new millennium, China’s dependencies on the Indian Ocean meant that they were increasing their security and economic presence. This meant more deployment of Chinese military and cultivating better ties with South Asian states to have a foothold. In the possibility of a conflict or war, Japan’s supplies and trade routes will be under concern with the overt presence of its antagonist neighbour, China.
For the regional states, Japan’s entry is positive on many fronts. Japan has a credible lending record in infrastructural developments. On its own, it is an enviable success story of economic development. Unlike China, Japan has shown no extra-territorial ambitions and therefore raises no security risks.
For India, Japan’s entry is a reassuring presence of an extra-regional actor offsetting China. The convergence of India's Act East policy and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy has further solidified the bilateral relationship. Both countries share a common vision of promoting regional connectivity and ensuring a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
Japan's efforts to strengthen its partnerships with like-minded countries like India is to promote a rules-based order and ensure regional stability. Even for states like Bangladesh, Japan’s presence provides diversification of aid, investment and trade options. Typically, small states benefit from extra-regional presence where they can hedge and gain simultaneous benefits.
The convergence between South Asian states, namely India and Bangladesh, with Japan is promising. Japan's willingness to provide funding and development assistance has opened new avenues for cooperation which can have significant bearing on regional projects of integration as well.
Despite the promising outlook, South Asia continues to face significant challenges in terms of its political and economic barriers. Take for instance, India’s ability to leverage Japan’s presence is dependent on two sets of factors. One is within India’s ambit to change. India has to ensure the ease of operations and adequate compatibility to allow Japanese flow of investment to operate. Apart from this, it is in India’s hands to handle its politically volatile regions like Northeast so that Japan finds it economically viable to invest in the region for long term gains.
Another set of factors is beyond India’s control. This involves regional upheavals and instability that can affect Japan’s engagement. Take for example how Bangladesh’s sudden regime change puts the aspiration of regional projects into uncertainty. Apart from upheavals, states are usually guarded about their sovereignty because of which regional projects have barely been fruitful. This involves the long and complicated history of South Asia’s partitioned geography, intricate demography and political suspicion.
If political and economic hurdles, such as security issues and trade barriers, continue to remain, Japan’s presence in the region is likely to remain in a low-equilibrium trap. This means that there is enough potential, but significant persisting hurdles do not allow the parties to reach optimum result. Japan might still maintain its security and economic presence in the region for its own benefits at a lower threshold. However, that is unlikely to have any transformative effects on the potential of regionalism in South Asia. At best, it would ensure national projects that might satisfy immediate requirements of a regime. Geopolitical changes have brought Japan closer to the region but its future depends on whether the regional states would be able to put their house in order.
Udayan Das is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, St. Xavier’s College, Kolkata and a Visiting Fellow at Asian Confluence.
Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of Asian Confluence
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