Assessing Japan’s Strategic Footprints in Myanmar

 Keywords: Myanmar, Coup D’état, Japan’s Foreign Policy, China, ASEAN, Indo-Pacific

Date: 02nd June, 2024

In the immediate aftermath of the military coup d’état, Japan not only condemned and rebuked the 1^st February 2021 coup but also expressed a strong commitment to Myanmar’s democratic restoration. It urged the military (Tatmadaw) to release the arrested NLD leaders and ‘swiftly restore Myanmar’s democratic political system’. This unwavering stand should be assessed in the light of its attempts to navigate troubled waters and re-affirm its strategic commitment in Myanmar.

A day after the Tatmadaw took over power, the then Japanese defence minister Yasuhide Nakayama told Reuters that if his country did not handle the unfolding political and economic developments in Myanmar triggered by the coup, Japan risks Myanmar becoming a part of China’s ‘league’. Such comments highlighted the strategic significance of Myanmar in Japan’s foreign policy strategy in the wake of China’s multi-layered ties with Myanmar to maintain its strategic dominance in the war-torn country.

The military coup cut-short the emerging democracy and that led to a reversal of the positive progress made so far. Japan faced a dilemma on how to respond to the coup in the impoverished Southeast Asian nation. The apprehension that any harsh policy may further push Myanmar in China’s fold was a deterrent factor for Japan to continue engaging with the junta regime.

Tokyo’s response to the coup came in the form of the cancellation of all new ODA to Myanmar, sparring the pre-existing projects, and occasional shunting of military figures in government meetings along with simultaneous behind-the-room engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG).

Despite the challenges, Japan has maintained a strategic approach to engagement in Myanmar through financial aid and infrastructural investments. This approach is driven by two key objectives. The first is balancing China’s geostrategic dominance in Myanmar. The second is providing non-combatant humanitarian support as a responsible global and regional actor.

Japan was the sixth top investor in Myanmar in 2021 and Myanmar has been the top beneficiary of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Between 2011 and 2013, Japan’s economic aid (ODA), which focused on the broad agenda of “democratization, national reconciliation, and sustainable development,” amounted to approximately $20 million, as per official data. The amount was $1.8 billion in 2019.

Given the scale of mass human rights violations, displacement of millions of civilians rendering acute starvation, the spread of epidemic diseases, and homelessness across the country, this humanitarian support is crucial. Understanding the complexity of these twin objectives is essential to comprehending Japan’s strategic engagement in Myanmar.

The findings of a survey report published by the Tokyo University’s Research Centre for Sustainable Peace (RCSP) in 2023 inferred that despite Japanese companies and actors facing criticisms from civil society and right groups for neglecting grave human rights violations under the junta regime, majority of the Japanese companies and operators of significant projects in the post-coup Myanmar have plans to retain their hold and continue to facilitate Tokyo’s efforts to play a role in the country’s infrastructural development in the near-to-medium term.

Japan’s strategic footprints in the post-coup Myanmar environment can be ascertained from the massive presence of Japanese companies, contractors, and business entrepreneurs and their resilience to continue to operate in the troubled country despite political and economic disincentives in the post-2021 coup environment.

Some of the key investment projects include the $3.28 billion Thilawa SEZ on the outskirts of Yangon, the $700 million Yetagun Gas Project in the Andaman Sea, and the $700 million Yoma Group-led Landmark Central Project in Yangon, to name a few. The last project has been re-started after a brief pause in 2021. The abovementioned survey further highlighted these mega projects as ‘problematic’ because of their failure to ‘disclose their efforts to minimize their human rights impacts.’

Japan’s continued ODA and business ties with the military junta raise displeasure by human rights groups such as Human Rights Now and Mekong Watch. The pertinent question is whether Tokyo has overlooked criticisms against Japanese companies’ lenient approach to observance of national and international human rights guidelines, such as the ones provided by the United Nations. This approach, while controversial, underscores Japan’s strategic commitment to Myanmar’s economic development and its efforts to counterbalance China’s influence in the region.

Unlike its Western counterparts such as the US, Japan is determined to continue to engage with Myanmar and expand its strategic footprints. Concurrently, Japan’s approach aligns with its larger geopolitical strategy of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ region, resonating with its partners such as the US, Australia, India, and other European counterparts. This suggests that collectively counter-checking China’s expanding land and maritime strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region is a key driver of Japan’s strategic approach in Myanmar.

At the same time, Japan’s strategic footprints, exemplified by its massive investments, are also linked to its assertive foreign policy in the ASEAN region. Myanmar is the poorest ASEAN country and in Tokyo’s calculations it is imperative to effectively retain its economic and political footprints in Myanmar, failing which may echo negative repercussions across ASEAN and even further in the Indo-Pacific. 

Tokyo’s approach to maintaining and expanding strategic footprints in Myanmar through aid and investments highlights its maturity to effectively navigate between traditional criticisms of its approach and the Western governments’ approach that focuses mainly on democratic transition and prevention of human rights violations. In doing so, Tokyo is charting its diplomatic path to achieve the twin strategic goals of checking China’s dominance in Myanmar and continuing its traditional policy of providing humanitarian assistance.

Md. Farijuddin Khan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Dhanamanjuri University (DMU), Manipur. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of Asian Confluence