Commentaries
Keywords: Bangladesh, U.S. Foreign Policy, Biden Administration, Democracy, Elections
Date: 12, December, 2023
Washington’s emerging dynamics with Bangladesh reflects a complex interface of four undercurrents in U.S. foreign policy. Following four disruptive years of the Trump presidency, President Biden came to the White House promising to restore American democracy at home and help strengthen democratic processes abroad.
For the Biden administration, renewing America’s global leadership has also meant engaging with allies and partners in a grand narrative of democracies vs autocracies. This has meant a more interventionist and activist approach when it comes to dealing with allegations of democratic erosion and human rights allegations in countries that are otherwise like-minded partners in matters of security and economics in the Indo-Pacific, such as in the case of Bangladesh.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of State announced that it was “taking steps to impose visa restrictions on Bangladeshi individuals responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh” including “members of law enforcement, the ruling party, and the political opposition.”
Additionally, the U.S. government also sanctioned Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). The U.S. Department of Treasury in its press release contented that “widespread allegations of serious human rights abuse in Bangladesh” by RAB during “Bangladeshi government’s war on drugs” threatened “U.S. national security interests by undermining the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the economic prosperity of the people of Bangladesh.”
The two governments, meanwhile, have held their 9th bilateral Security Dialogue and the 10th Defence Dialogue, portending their shared concerns and convergences for regional security in the Indo-Pacific, more particularly in the Bay of Bengal region. Therefore, what do these parallel and seemingly contradictory policy postures convey about the dynamics of U.S.-Bangladesh ties, and the rationale of Washington’s inter-agency mechanics in steering U.S. foreign policy.
What may appear as irreconcilable differences among different departments of the U.S. government are but intrinsic to the grand machinery of U.S. foreign policymaking optics and substance. American scholar Walter Russell Mead in his book Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World provides a useful lens of four U.S. foreign policy schools, to explain the operation of America’s engagement with the outside world as interaction among four distinct yet interacting philosophical principles.
Hamiltonians (named after U.S. 1st Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton) views the world as a marketplace in which America’s influence and position has to be enhanced. For them, international economics remains the primary driver of U.S. foreign policy. Jeffersonians (named after the 3rd U.S. President and the 1st Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson), believe democracy to be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and a value to be cultivated and nurtured, even if it means disentangling from the outside world, and focussing on nation building at home.
Jacksonians (named after the 7th U.S. President, Andrew Jackson), are often associated with unabashed projection of American power abroad, assertively invoking American interest and a more populist view of representative democracy. Wilsonians (named after the 28th U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson and a leading proponent of the League of Nations) consider the United States to be a saviour of democracy in the world, and unlike the Jeffersonians, are more activist in promoting it abroad as well.
The United States remains one of the largest export destinations of Bangladeshi products, particularly garments. Bangladesh also assumes growing significance in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, primarily owing to China’s inroads in the Bay of Bengal region, and the India-China competition prevalent there. The domestic squabble between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), over the conduct of the upcoming election has indeed created a complex space to navigate for proximate and distant powers.
For instance, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin commenting on the U.S. approach towards Bangladesh said, “…Indeed, while turning a blind eye to its own racial discrimination, gun violence and drug proliferation problems, a certain country has long been interfering in the internal affairs of Bangladesh and many other developing countries under the pretext of democracy and human rights.”
New Delhi publicly stuck to its diplomatic stance with India’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi commenting, “We are neighbours. We have a lot of stakes in what happens in our neighbourhood. I am sure other countries will have their own relationship with Bangladesh.” “We have been repeatedly highlighting our position on Bangladesh's election. This is something that Bangladeshi people have to decide for themselves,” he said.
Dhaka’s political leadership has been categorical while responding to Washington’s activist mode. Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen commented, “As a global power, they, of course, can exercise power over others but we are not bothered because we know how to hold an acceptable election.” Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina retorted, “As for the US, you can see that Mr Trump didn’t accept the results. What do they have to say now? We have told everybody, if they want to send observers, they can do it.”
In the final analysis, does Washington really care about the health of democracy outside its national boundaries? When it does seem to care, does it resort to mere lip service or sincerely use its tools to affect democratic transition and sustenance? On the other hand, does it prefer to turn a blind eye to non-democratic forces when they suit its geopolitical interest? The U.S. foreign policy, at least when it comes to liberal interventionism (a curious concoction of Jeffersonians and Wilsonians) in the form of democracy promotion, appears at odds with the sovereignty firewall of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
What is transpiring in U.S.-Bangladesh relationship, and how it might pan out is anybody’s guess. However, despite public statements, policy pronouncements, responses and counter-responses, Washington and Dhaka as well as other critical stakeholders perhaps know more than the sum of its parts. The complex interaction among different agencies of the U.S. foreign policy machinery leaves much to navigate and manoeuvre not only for countries at the receiving end, but also for those at the helm of policymaking and implementation in Washington and its regional bureaus.
Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of Asian Confluence
Monish Tourangbam is a New Delhi-based strategic analyst and the Honorary Director of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies.
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